## Approved For Release 2001/03/96 CIAERDP 88B00365B000200050038-1

TS 204206/72 USIB-D-64.7/2 CCPC-D-18/72

- (1) To establish and maintain a national narcotics intelligence system;
- (2) To ensure the proper dissemination of narcotics related intelligence data to officials at all levels of Government with responsibilities in the drug abuse area; and
- (3) To ensure the maximum feasible enforcement effort to prevent drug abuse in the United States.
- b. ONNI is designed primarily as a service organization. It will be a central repository for narcotics related intelligence data, classified and unclassified, collected both domestically and abroad by all components of the intelligence community as well as by non-intelligence agencies. The ONNI will process, study, interpret, and evaluate these data and prepare them in suitable form for dissemination to all agencies Federal, state and local concerned with the narcotics program and authorized to receive such information. ONNI will endeavor to look for patterns and will study the narcotics problem as a whole. It will also make recommendations as the facts appear to warrant on such matters as shifts in emphasis. In addition, ONNI will translate intelligence needs into specific requests to the operating agencies to meld in with their total collection requirements.
- c. ONNI has no collection or law enforcement responsibilities. Its major function will be to provide comprehensive intelligence support to criminal investigations, to other current enforcement activities and to those who establish policies with regard to efforts to control the international drug traffic.

## Approved For Release 2001/03/06 PCIA-RDP88B00365R000200050038-1

TS 204206/72 USIB-D-64.7/2 CCPC-D-18/72

computerization of name data and BNDD's recent initiation of a priority program to computerize the name data in its files should assist in this area.

3. These files have also revealed a lack of certain basic information on informants, contacts and modi operandi of narcotics networks. This information gap results in part from a failure to debrief informants uniformly with intelligence requirements in mind. Attempts should be made to ensure uniform debriefing of informants on key narcotics-related information both by U.S. law enforcement representatives abroad as well as by indigenous police services. This effort would be materially assisted by the development of a handbook for use not only by U.S. Special Agents but also by officers of the host government's local services. Techniques, procedures and formats for reporting both operational and substantive information derived from these debriefings should be standardized.

## H. Washington Coordination

- 1. The above paragraphs have discussed primarily the problems which are encountered in the field by U.S. agencies trying to combat illicit narcotics trafficking and smuggling. To a large extent, however, these problems stem directly from Washington where the whole effort should be pulled together. The complexity of the situation is compounded by the number and diversity of U.S. Government elements which are involved in some phase of narcotics activity. Some of these ignore or fail to understand the need for coordination and act unilaterally in furtherance of their own missions, some of which are disparate, some overlapping. And differences of opinion exist as to how and where their resources should be employed and as to who has the responsibility for certain actions in connection with illicit narcotics activities.
- 2. So far, of the various U.S. Agency actions against the narcotics problem more have been taken in reaction to ad hoc pressures than as part of a coordinated U.S. Government effort. An example of such ad hoc Washington action which has had continuing repercussions in misunderstandings in the field was a joint cable of 23 December 1972 which was designed to set forth the role of CIA in relation to BNDD and Customs in the narcotics intelligence collection effort, but instead left this open to varying interpretations and adaptations by the missions. Fuller staffing in Washington leading to more definitive guidelines would have prevented many problems resulting from differences of interpretation of this cable. Attempts have been made to clarify these differences, not only through numerous

- 35 -